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Abstract
This paper examines the e®ects of environmental performance on ¯nancial performance
using the data of Japanese manufacturing ¯rms from 2004 to 2008. As the environmental
performance, our study considers the two di®erent environmental issues of waste and
greenhouse gas emissions in capturing the e®ects of corporate environmental management
on ¯nancial performance. In addition, to clarify how each ¯nancial performance responds
to a ¯rm's e®ort in dealing with di®erent environmental issues, we utilize many ¯nancial
performance indices re°ecting various market evaluations. Our estimation results show
the di®erent e®ects of each environmental performance on ¯nancial performances. For
example, while an increase in waste emissions generally improves ¯nancial performance,
their reduction ameliorates ¯nancial performance in dirty industries. In addition, while
greenhouse gas reduction leads to an increase in return on equity, it does not have a
signi¯cant e®ect on return on sales which re°ects the evaluation in the goods market, and
it leads to a decrease in the natural logarithm of Tobin's q, which indicates the value of
intangible assets.
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1 Introduction
Does better environmental performance improve a ¯rm's ¯nancial performance? Seeking
to answer this question, many studies have been conducted from both the economic and
business administration perspectives (see e.g. Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Hart and
Ahuja, 1996; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Konar and Cohen, 2001; King and Lenox, 2002; Nakao et
al., 2007).1 Researches on the relationship between environmental and ¯nancial performance
are not only meaningful in the sense of analyzing ¯rm behavior, but also important from the
social bene¯t perspective. In economic literature, environmental problems have traditionally
been treated as inconsistencies between social and private bene¯ts and have mainly been left
to government intervention to solve them. However, if ¯nancial performance is positively
related to environmental performance, ¯rms have incentives to reduce their environmental
damages. This means that environmental problems may be solved by the market mechanism
without government intervention, leading to a preferable environment for both ¯rms and the
government. For this reason, analyzing the relationship between environmental and ¯nancial
performance also has important policy implications.
In recent years, many stakeholders of ¯rms such as governments, non-governmental or-
ganizations, local communities, consumers, trading partners, employees, investors, ¯nancial
agencies and stockholders are conscious of corporate environmental management, especially
in developed countries. This directly or indirectly in°uences the ¯nancial performance of
¯rms. For example, if a ¯rm violates an environmental regulation or causes an environmental
accident, the ¯rm not only has to pay ¯nes and penalties, but may su®er from a loss of trust
and reputation or a boycott of goods. Such risks have negative e®ects on the evaluation of a
¯rm's future pro¯ts. On the other hand, a ¯rm that actively addresses environmental issues
might gain positive reputation among some stakeholders and may in°uence them to expect
that the ¯rm will succeed in reducing environmental risks and production costs in the long
term. Therefore, ¯rms have an incentive to address various environmental issues against the
backdrop of various stakeholders' interests.
This paper demonstrates the relationship between environmental and ¯nancial perfor-
mance, and moreover, considers the relationship between the characteristics of each environ-
mental issue and the responses of various markets and stakeholders' behaviors behind them.
In previous empirical studies, the relationships between environmental and ¯nancial perfor-
mance are controversial. Cordeiro and Sarkis (1997), Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001), Wagner
et al. (2002), and Rassier and Earnhart (2010) advocate a partially or completely negative
relationship.2 On the other hand, Hart and Ahuja (1996), Russo and Fouts (1997), Konar and
Cohen (2001), and King and Lenox (2002) report a positive relationship. Some studies such
as Hart (1995) and Ambec and Lanoie (2008) indicate the channels from which environmental
1Murphy (2002), Molina-Azor¶³n et al. (2009), and Blanco et al. (2009) provide detailed surveys on the
relationship between environmental and ¯nancial performance.
2Walley and Whitehead (1994) theoretically explain a negative relationship between environmental and
¯nancial performance.
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performance a®ects ¯nancial performance. Speci¯cally, Hart (1995) explains the relationship
between the two performances by considering natural resources in the resource-based view.
Ambec and Lanoie (2008) summarize the channels and suggest that better environmental
performance can improve ¯nancial performance in both revenue (e.g. better access to certain
markets; di®erentiating products; and selling pollution-control technologies) and cost aspects
(e.g. risk management and relations with external stakeholders; costs of material, energy, and
service; cost of capital; and cost of labor).
Meanwhile, most of the existing studies do not necessarily capture the characteristics of
each environmental issue enough since they use a few indices as the proxy for environmen-
tal performance. In recent years, there have been many kinds of environmental issues such
as global warming, acid rain, deforestation, ozone depletion, biodiversity, pollution of the
environment by toxic chemical compounds, and waste issues. Each environmental issue has
di®erent characteristics such as the scope of pollution (e.g. local or global), length of time until
damages emerge, severity of the damages, facilities for specifying the polluters, and existence
of regulations and international treaties. These various characteristics suggest that di®erent
stakeholders may place emphasis on di®erent environmental issues. Some stakeholders, for
example a local community, may directly su®er from a ¯rm's environmental pollution while
others may not su®er from it but may have monetary relationship with the ¯rm. Therefore,
some stakeholders may think that global warming is a more important problem than any other
environmental issue and others may think that the waste problem is the most crucial issue.
These stakeholders' di®erentiated preferences for environmental issues may a®ect ¯nancial
performance. Taking this into account, this paper therefore considers two di®erent environ-
mental issues, waste and greenhouse gas emissions, as environmental performance. Waste
and greenhouse gas emissions are di®erent in many points such as the scope of pollution and
existence of regulations, and therefore they are related to di®erent kinds of stakeholders who
directly or indirectly in°uence the ¯nancial performance of ¯rms through various markets.
Employing the amount of waste and greenhouse gas emissions enables us to investigate the
di®erence of the market evaluation on di®erent kinds of environmental issues.
Previous studies using the amount of emissions as environmental performance are as fol-
lows. Hart and Ahuja (1996) show that a reduction in emissions of selected pollutants improves
¯nancial performance, such as return on sales (ROS), return on assets (ROA), and return on
equity (ROE) for a sample of S&P 500 ¯rms. Konar and Cohen (2001) also indicate that a
decrease in toxic chemical emissions ameliorates Tobin's q¡1 in the S&P 500 ¯rms.3 King and
Lenox (2002) obtain the same conclusion using toxic chemicals emissions as environmental
performance, and ROA and Tobin's q as ¯nancial performance for a sample of publicly traded
U.S. manufacturing ¯rms. In contrast, Wagner et al. (2002) make an index for environmental
performance based on SO2, NOx, and Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) emissions, and use
ROS, ROE, and return on capital employed (ROCE) as ¯nancial performance for a sample of
¯rms in the European paper manufacturing industry. They show that worsened environmental
3Konar and Cohen (2001) also use the number of lawsuits as environmental performance.
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performance improves ROCE and has no signi¯cant e®ect on ROS and ROE.4
As for ¯nancial performance, this paper pays attention to many indices such as ROE,
ROA, return on investment (ROI), return on invested capital (ROIC), ROS, Tobin's q ¡ 1,
and the natural logarithm of Tobin's q in order to take into account each market's evaluation
of corporate management dealing with di®erent environmental issues. In existing research
studies, ¯nancial performance is proxied by some indices such as ROA, ROE, and ROS by
Hart and Ahuja (1996); ROA by Russo and Fouts (1997); Tobin's q ¡ 1 and the natural
logarithm of Tobin's q by Konar and Cohen (2001); ROS by Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001);
ROA and Tobin's q by King and Lenox (2002); ROCE, ROE, and ROS by Wagner et al.
(2002); ROA, ROS, and Tobin's q by Elsayed and Paton (2005); and ROA and Tobin's
q¡1 by Nakao et al. (2007). These studies provide mixed results on the relationship between
environmental and ¯nancial performance, implying that there are various channels from which
environmental performance a®ects ¯nancial performance. Given this, the important point is
that there is a possibility that each ¯nancial performance is a®ected directly or indirectly by
di®erent stakeholders.
This paper focuses on the Japanese manufacturing sector using the data of 268 ¯rms
from 2004 to 2008. Since the manufacturing sector is generally considered to have a closer
relationship with environmental issues, we consider that manufacturing ¯rms have stronger
incentives to actively or voluntarily deal with environmental issues through various means. In
practice, active environmental management such as over-compliance with regulations, publi-
cation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports, and other voluntary approaches are
introduced in many Japanese ¯rms. With regard to previous studies using Japanese ¯rm-
level data, Nakao et al. (2007) uses the environmental score from the Nikkei Environmental
Management Survey as environmental performance and shows that better environmental per-
formance improves ¯nancial performance such as ROA and Tobin's q ¡ 1 in the Japanese
manufacturing sector. Nagayama and Takeda (2007), Yamaguchi (2008), and Takeda and
Tomozawa (2008) also investigate the e®ects of new environmental information (e.g. release
of environmental management ranking) on stock prices by using an event study methodology.
Furthermore, Cole et al. (2006) analyze the determinants of environmental performance of
¯rms in Japan and ¯nd that globalization has positive impacts on environmental management.
Finally, our contributions to literature are as follows. First, in order to capture the char-
acteristics of di®erent environmental issues, we pay attention to both waste and greenhouse
gas emissions as environmental performance. Second, to clarify how various ¯nancial perfor-
mances are in°uenced by di®erent environmental issues, we use seven ¯nancial performance
indices such as ROE, ROA, ROI, ROIC, ROS, Tobin's q ¡ 1, and the natural logarithm of
Tobin's q, and examine the behaviors of various stakeholders. Third, to the best of our knowl-
edge, this paper is the ¯rst in attempting to utilize the amount of emissions as environmental
4As the proxy for environmental performance, some previous studies use integrated indices provided by
independent organizations such as rating companies, instead of the amount of emissions. For example, Russo
and Fouts (1997), Butz and Plattner (2000), Salama (2005), and Elsayed and Paton (2005) utilize environmental
ranking as environmental performance.
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performance instead of environmental scores from studies using Japanese ¯rm-level data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the estimation
methodology and data. Section 3 presents empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Estimation methodology and data
The main purpose of this study is to examine the e®ects of environmental performance on
¯nancial performance. Following previous research studies, some other determinants that
may have e®ects on ¯nancial performance are also included in the estimation equation as
explanatory variables in addition to environmental performance. Our basic speci¯cation is
expressed as follows:
Financial performanceit = ¯0 + ¯1Sizeit + ¯2Growthit +R&Dit
+ ¯4Advertisementit + ¯5Capital intensityit + ¯6Leverageit
+ ¯7Wasteit + ¯8Greenhouse gasit + ¹i + "it (1)
where i denotes the ¯rm; t indicates the period; and ¹ is the ¯rm-speci¯c ¯xed e®ect. Financial
performance is ROE, ROA, ROI, ROIC, ROS, Tobin's q¡1, or the natural logarithm of Tobin's
q. We use these dependent variables because each of them re°ects the behavior and evaluation
of various stakeholders with di®erent interests. ROE includes the stockholders' evaluation and
performance of the goods market. ROA, ROI, and ROIC re°ect not only the equity capital
contributed by stockholders but also borrowed capital provided by creditors and investors.
ROS indicates the market evaluation by consumers and trading partners. Tobin's q ¡ 1 and
the natural logarithm of Tobin's q are interpreted as the intangible assets value of the ¯rms.5
Then, as for explanatory variables, Size represents the ¯rm size; Growth is the ¯rm growth.
R&D is the research and development intensity; Advertisement is the advertisement intensity;
Capital intensity is de¯ned as the sales and operating revenue divided by stockholders' equity;
and Leverage is the ¯nancial leverage, de¯ned as the sum of liabilities and net assets divided
by total stockholders' equity. The detailed de¯nitions of each variable are provided in Table
A1 of the Appendix. The rationale underlying our selection of these variables is based on
previous preeminent studies such as Russo and Fouts (1997), Konar and Cohen (2001), King
and Lenox (2002), and Nakao et al. (2007).
As the proxies for environmental performance, we take waste and greenhouse gas emissions
into account. Waste and Greenhouse gas are de¯ned as waste and greenhouse gas emissions
divided by sales and operating revenue, respectively. We pay attention to these two factors
5Based on Konar and Cohen (2001), the concept of Tobin's q can be brie°y explained as follows. The market
value of the ¯rm (MV ) can be expressed as the summation of the ¯rm values from the tangible assets (VT )
and from the intangible assets (VI). Since Tobin's q is de¯ned as MV=VT , from a simple calculation, Tobin's
q ¡ 1 is equal to VI=VT . Therefore, Tobin's q ¡ 1 is interpreted as the intangible assets value of the ¯rms,
such as patents, brand name, and so on. Following Hirsch and Seaks (1993) and Konar and Cohen (2001), we
use Tobin's q ¡ 1 and the natural logarithm of Tobin's q as the dependent variable. Hirsch and Seaks (1993)
compare the two speci¯cations with respect to Tobin's q using Box-Cox transformations and show that the
semi-log speci¯cation has higher log-likelihood values than the linear speci¯cation.
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because they re°ect di®erent kinds of environmental problems. In Japan, waste emissions
are regulated by various laws. Many environmental pollution issues emerged during the
high economic growth period of the 1950s through 1970s. Given that these issues aroused
national discussion on environmental problems, various environmental laws and regulations
were formulated such as the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control in 1967, which
was succeeded by the Environment Basic Law in 1993 and the Basic Act on Establishing a
Sound Material-Cycle Society in 2000. On the other hand, greenhouse gas emissions have only
been paid attention to in relatively recent years since the address of global warming issues,
which lead to the formulation of the Law Concerning the Promotion of the Measures to Cope
with Global Warming in 1998. However, this law does not explicitly address the reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions of individual ¯rms. More regulations on greenhouse gas emissions
may be imposed in the future due to this insu±ciency, individual ¯rms need to deal with
this uncertainty. In particular, waste and greenhouse gases have di®erent characteristics as
environmental issues, such as the scope of pollution and existence of regulations.
Our study focuses especially on the sign and signi¯cance of each environmental perfor-
mance on various ¯nancial performances, which is in°uenced by various stakeholders' be-
haviors. If environmentally-friendly management has positive (negative) e®ects on ¯nancial
performance, the sign of environmental performance can be negative (positive). In addition, if
environmentally-friendly management is not related to ¯nancial performance, the coe±cient
is not signi¯cant.
Our sample is drawn from three data sources. The data of waste and greenhouse gas
emissions come from the Corporate Social Responsibility Database released by Toyo Keizai
(2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). Since Toyo Keizai (2006) started to conduct questionnaire surveys
on waste and greenhouse gas emissions, we use all available data in the initiation of this study.
Furthermore, because the Toyo Keizai conducts multi-year questions in its survey, we utilize
the results of the survey conducted at the most recent time.6 Next, stock prices come from the
\Kabuka" (Stock prices) CD-ROM 2010 provided by Toyo Keizai (2010). Finally, all other
data are taken from the NEEDS (Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System) released
by Nikkei Digital Media (2010). Based on all available data of manufacturing ¯rms from
these three data sources, our sample consists of an unbalanced panel data, which includes 268
Japanese manufacturing ¯rms from 2004 to 2008. Descriptive statistics of each variable are
reported in Table A2 of the Appendix.
As the estimation method, we use the ¯xed e®ect (FE) model because our sample consists
of ¯ve-year unbalanced panel data. The FE estimation allows us to control unobserved ¯rm-
speci¯c ¯xed e®ects that may a®ect ¯nancial performance and, therefore, deals with the
endogeneity issues resulting from unobserved ¯rm-speci¯c e®ects. Although we also conduct
the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and the random e®ects (RE) estimation, econometric
6Speci¯cally, the data from 2004 comes from Toyo Keizai (2006); data from 2005 comes from Toyo Keizai
(2007); data from 2006 comes from Toyo Keizai (2008); and data from 2007 and 2008 comes from Toyo Keizai
(2009).
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tests indicate that the FE estimation is preferable to other estimations.7 Our analysis proceeds
as follows. First, we report the estimation results using the full sample. Second, in capturing
the relationship between the dirtiness of industries and environmental performance, we divide
the full sample into `clean' and `dirty' industries since environmental performance is associated
with the inherent dirtiness of an industry. Every ¯rm in our sample in the manufacturing
sector is classi¯ed into one of sixteen industries, listed in detail as shown in Table A3 of the
Appendix. This classi¯cation criterion follows Mani and Wheeler (1998).8 Finally, to assess
the role of ¯rm growth in the relationship between ¯nancial performance and environmental
performance, we conduct the estimation, adding the interaction terms between environmental
performance and ¯rm growth.9
3 Estimation results
3.1 Case of the full sample
Table 1 presents the estimation results using the full sample. Since ROE shows how much of
a pro¯t the ¯rms make using the equity capital invested by the stockholders, it is one of the
comprehensive indices of ¯rm performance. In column (1) in which the dependent variable
is ROE, the e®ect of waste emissions on ROE is signi¯cantly positive, suggesting that an
increase in waste emissions improves ¯nancial performance. This result holds except for the
case in column (5) where ROS is used as the dependent variable. Since waste emissions are
regulated by several laws such as the Waste Management and Public Cleansing Law in Japan,
most ¯rms usually operate by abiding to these regulations. Therefore, stakeholders such as
stockholders, investors, and ¯nancial institutions may highly value ¯rms that legitimately
increase waste emissions. In addition, if environmental regulation-abiding ¯rms are forced to
further reduce waste emissions, they have to bear the additional costs generated by corporate
environmental management. As a result, this leads to a decrease in their pro¯ts in the future.
In columns (6) and (7), the results show that the e®ects of waste emissions on Tobin's q ¡ 1
and the natural logarithm of Tobin's q are also positive, suggesting that an increase in waste
emissions improves the evaluation of a ¯rm's intangible assets.
[Table 1 here]
In contrast, greenhouse gas emissions have a signi¯cant negative impact on ROE, imply-
ing that stockholders take the long-run ¯rm performance into account because ROE does
not include debt but re°ects equity capital. Speci¯cally, due to the fact that greenhouse gas
emissions may be regulated in the future, ¯rms that seek to reduce them voluntarily in order
7The results of the pooled OLS and RE estimations can be provided upon request.
8Cole et al. (2006) examine the relationship between globalization and environmental management using
Japanese ¯rm data. They also follow the criterion of `clean' and `dirty' suggested by Mani and Wheeler (1998).
9Konar and Cohen (2001) analyze the relationship between environmental performance on ¯nancial perfor-
mance, taking into account the interaction terms between advertisement and ¯rm growth, and between R&D
and ¯rm growth.
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to mitigate future regulation risks obtain higher evaluations from stockholders. In addition,
in the sense that global warming issues broadly a®ect human beings, it is related to a wider
range of stakeholders unlike waste problems. Therefore, stockholders may expect that ¯rms
addressing global warming issues will proactively improve their corporate reputation and im-
age in the future. However, it is noteworthy that the e®ects of greenhouse gases on ROA,
ROI, ROIC, and ROS in columns (2) to (5) are insigni¯cant. These results may be attributed
to the facts that ROA, ROI, and ROIC include the value of debt as well as equity capital, and
that ROS re°ects the evaluation in the goods markets. In addition, although the coe±cient
of greenhouse gases on Tobin's q ¡ 1 is not signi¯cant in column (6), its e®ect on the natu-
ral logarithm of Tobin's q is signi¯cantly positive, suggesting that greenhouse gas emissions
increase the value of intangible assets.
Furthermore, both waste and greenhouse gas emissions do not have a signi¯cant impact on
ROS. Unlike other accounting-based ¯nancial performance, ROS does not include the capital
structure in its calculation. Therefore, our results indicate that goods markets re°ecting the
evaluation by consumers and trading partners do not pay attention to a ¯rms' e®orts to
reduce waste and greenhouse gas emissions. This result shows that stakeholders who do not
have monetary relationships with ¯rms seem to disregard environmental management as far
as the ¯rms operate by abiding to laws and regulations. While this result is not in line with
that of Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001) who indicate negative impacts of pollution prevention and
end-of-pipe e±ciencies on ROS, it is similar to that of Wagner et al. (2002). Therefore, from
Table 1, it is evident that the reactions and responses of capital markets to the environmental
performance of ¯rms are di®erent for each environmental issue. As for other explanatory
variables, the coe±cients generally have expected signs. However, the e®ects of R&D on
¯nancial performance are signi¯cantly negative in most cases. Although this result seems to
be somewhat counter-intuitive, previous studies such as King and Lenox (2002) also report
the negative relationship between R&D and ¯nancial performance.
3.2 Cases of clean and dirty industries
We investigate the e®ects of environmental performance on ¯nancial performance, dividing
our sample of the manufacturing industry into the two subsets of clean and dirty industries.
This analysis allows us to examine the relationships between the dirtiness of an industry and
its environmental performance. Following the classi¯cation criterion suggested by Mani and
Wheeler (1998), we report the estimation results in the cases of clean and dirty industries
separately. The detailed classi¯cation of clean and dirty industries is reported in Table A3
of the Appendix. Table 2 presents the results in the case of clean industries. The sign and
signi¯cance of the coe±cients of waste and greenhouse gas emissions are similar to those in
the case of the full sample in Table 1, and the impacts of waste are qualitatively larger than
those in the case of the full sample. This is partly because the number of ¯rms which are
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classi¯ed into clean industries in our sample is larger than that of dirty industries.
[Table 2 here]
Table 3 illustrates the results when our sample is reduced to the ¯rms in dirty industries.
In this case, waste has a signi¯cant negative impact on ROA, ROI, and ROIC. This outcome
may result from the facts that the cost to dispose waste is higher in dirty industries due to
more severe regulations, and that ¯rms in dirty industries often confront both more risks of
failure to comply with the laws and regulations, and lawsuits. In addition, other stakeholders
rather than environmental regulators (e.g. local residents) may penalize these ¯rms severely
(e.g. boycott of goods). Given these reasons, the ¯rms in dirty industries that seek to
reduce waste emissions have higher ¯nancial performance. As for greenhouse gas emissions,
its e®ects on ROE, ROA, ROI, and ROIC are signi¯cantly positive, suggesting that markets
value ¯rms that emit more greenhouse gases. Since greenhouse gas emissions are not regulated
by laws in Japan, ¯rms which have greater production and emit more greenhouse gases can
be highly valued. These results may imply that the problems of greenhouse gas emissions are
di®erent from that of waste laying which are regulated strictly by laws and regulations, and
most stakeholders seem to worry about an increase in cost as a result of seeking to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.
[Table 3 here]
In sum, while waste emissions have positive impact on most ¯nancial performances in the
case of the full sample and clean industries, they have negative impact on several ¯nancial
performances in the case of dirty industries. In this case, better environmental management
of waste emissions increases ¯nancial performance resulting from cost reductions in the future,
improvement in abilities to comply with laws, and reduction in lawsuit risks. On the other
hand, the signs and signi¯cances of the e®ects of greenhouse gas emissions varies depending on
¯nancial performance indices and the sample. Although a reduction in greenhouse gases leads
to an increase in ROE in the case of the full sample and clean industries, it causes a decrease
in the natural logarithm of Tobin's q in the case of the full sample and clean industries, and a
decrease in most ¯nancial performances in the case of dirty industries. The estimation results
provide mixed relationships between environmental and ¯nancial performance, implying that
the evaluation of each environmental performance is di®erent among various ¯nancial perfor-
mances. This result can be accounted for by the responses of stakeholders having di®erent
interests in varying markets.
3.3 Interaction between environmental performance and ¯rm growth
To capture the role of ¯rm growth in the relationship between environmental performance and
¯nancial performance, we add two interaction terms between ¯rm growth and environmental
performance, waste and greenhouse gases. Table 4 reports the results in the case of the full
sample with these two interaction terms. In columns (1) and (6) where the dependent variables
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are ROE and ROS, the interaction terms between waste and ¯rm growth have signi¯cantly
negative impact. This outcome means that the partial e®ect of waste on ¯nancial performance
is decreasing as ¯rm growth rises. However, the interaction terms between greenhouse gases
and ¯rm growth have insigni¯cant impact in all columns (1) to (7).
[Table 4 here]
Next, as the estimation procedure above, we divide the full sample into clean and dirty
industries. Table 5 presents the estimation results in the case of clean industries. In all
columns except for column (5), the interaction terms between waste and ¯rm growth have
signi¯cant negative impact on ¯nancial performance. In contrast, in all columns (1) to (7),
the interaction terms between greenhouse gas emissions and ¯rm growth have signi¯cant pos-
itive impact on ¯nancial performance. Although the coe±cient of waste is not signi¯cant, the
null hypothesis that both coe±cients of waste and its interaction term with ¯rm growth are
simultaneously zero is rejected at 1% signi¯cance level in the F test in all the cases except
for the case where ROS is used as the dependent variable in column (5). Also, although the
coe±cient of greenhouse gas emissions is not signi¯cant, we can reject the null hypothesis
that both coe±cients of greenhouse gases and its interaction term with ¯rm growth are si-
multaneously zero at 5% signi¯cance level in the F test in all columns (1) to (7). In order to
comprehensively demonstrate these results in more detail, we illustrate the ¯gures regarding
the partial e®ects of waste and greenhouse gases on ln (q) in column (7) in Figures 1 and
2. As ¯rm growth increases, the partial e®ect of waste decreases, but the partial e®ect of
greenhouse gases increases. The threshold level of ¯rm growth separating the negative and
positive e®ects of environmental performance on ln (q) is ¡0:1080 and ¡0:0679 in the case
of waste and greenhouse gases, respectively.10 In the case of waste emissions in Figure 1, its
partial e®ect is negative if ¯rm growth is positive. This outcome may result from the fact
that since waste emissions are regulated by laws, ¯rms with high growth rates can a®ord to
follow the regulations and make e®orts to reduce waste laying. In contrast, in the case of
greenhouse gas emissions in Figure 2, its partial e®ect is positive if ¯rm growth is positive.
One possible explanation is that since greenhouse gas emissions are not explicitly regulated,
the markets highly value ¯rms that prioritize an increase in production over a reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions when these ¯rms are growing rapidly.
[Table 5 here]
[Figure 1 here]
[Figure 2 here]
Table 6 shows the results in the case of dirty industries taking the two interaction terms
into account. Although the two interaction terms do not have signi¯cant e®ects in columns
10In this analysis, the number of observations such that ¯rm growth is below the threshold is 68 and 84 out
of 505 observations in the case of waste and greenhouse gas, respectively.
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(1) to (4), in columns (5) to (7) where ROS is used as the dependent variable, Tobin's q¡1, or
the natural logarithm of Tobin's q, the coe±cients of the two interaction terms are signi¯cant
and have the same signs as the case of Table 5.
[Table 6 here]
4 Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between environmental and ¯nancial performance using
the data of Japanese manufacturing ¯rms from 2004 to 2008. Since environmental issues have
been diverse in recent years, each stakeholder may have di®erent preferences for each envi-
ronmental issue. Given this, this study employs seven ¯nancial performance indices re°ecting
each market evaluation in order to clarify how each market evaluates corporate management
when dealing with di®erent environmental issues. Furthermore, in order to test the hypothesis
that each stakeholder may emphasize di®erent environmental issues, we utilize the amount
of waste and greenhouse gas emissions as the proxies for environmental performance. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the ¯rst in attempting to use emissions of waste and
greenhouse gases instead of environmental management scores from studies using Japanese
¯rm-level data.
Our estimation results show that the responses of ¯nancial performance are di®erent de-
pending on each environmental issue, the results of which are attributed to varying stake-
holder preferences. For example, while the e®ect of waste emissions on ¯nancial performance
is generally positive, waste emissions have a negative impact in dirty industries. One possible
explanation for this result is that the cost to dispose waste is higher in dirty industries due to
more strict regulations, and/or ¯rms in dirty industries often confront both more risks of fail-
ure to comply with laws, and lawsuits. In addition, while greenhouse gas reduction increases
ROE which re°ects the long-run ¯nancial performance, it does not have a signi¯cant e®ect
on ROS which shows the short-run ¯nancial performance. In other words, stockholders take
the long-run ¯rm performance into account, but consumers and trading partners do not care
about corporate environmental management in the short-run.
Our results have some policy implications for the relationship between ¯rms and the
government. Although environmental problems have mainly been left to government inter-
vention to solve them, if ¯rms have incentives to reduce their environmental damages, the
market mechanism could provide some clues to deal with environmental issues. Furthermore,
when the market mechanism alone cannot solve environmental issues, the government should
formulate appropriate regulations and laws to complement it.
11
Appendix: Data de¯nitions and sources
[Table A1 here]
[Table A2 here]
[Table A3 here]
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Figure 1: The partial e®ect of waste on ln (q)
Notes:
1. This ¯gure is illustrated based on the result of column (7), Table 5.
26
Figure 2: The partial e®ect of greenhouse gas on ln (q)
Notes:
1. This ¯gure is illustrated based on the result of column (7), Table 5.
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